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DOPUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS ACT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
ABsTRACT
Models of corporate behavior normally assume that a firm acts in the interest of share-
holders, and that shareholders care only about the returns they receive on the shares they
own in that firm. But shareholders should also care about the effects of a manager's
decisions on the value of shares they own in other firms, on the price they pay as con-
sumers of the firm's output, on the value of the firm's bonds they own, on government
tax revenue which finances public expenditures benefiting shareholders, etc. These effects
are normally presumed to be of second order. This paper reexamines this presumption,
argues that many of these effects are likely to be important, and examines how a variety




Ann Arbor, MI 48109Models of the behavior of corporations normally assume that amanager acts in the
interests of the firm's shareholders, and furthennore that shareholders care about the
manager's decisions only in so far as these decisions affect the returns shareholders receive
on the shares they own in that firm. If the return distribution on new projects is within the
span of the distributions on available securities, then shareholders unanimously want the
manager to maximize share values.' This is the objective that papers normally attribute
to corporations.2 But a manager's decisions can affect shareholders in more ways than just
through their effects on the value of shares in that firm. For example, shareholders normally
hold highly diversified portfolios, so they would want a manager to take into accountany
effects his decisions might have on the share values of other firms. If shareholders hold
proportional amounts of all the firms in an industry, for example, then their portfolio value
is maximized if they can induce each manager to maximize the market value of the industry
as a whole. Managers would do this by taking into account any externalities their firm
imposes on other firms in the industry, such as through spillovers of information from R&D
or through advertising or price changes that lead to changes in market shares. Everything
else equal, this would lead shareholders to prefer that the industry behave as a cartel and
charge the monopoly price, regardless of the implications for the share values of individual
firms. However, shareholders may also be consumers of the product, and to that degree
they want to discourage firms from exploiting their market power.3 Further, shareholders
Much ofthispaper was written while I was visitingthe Universidade Nova deLisboa. I would like to
thank seminar participants at the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin, and especially Mark Bagnoli
and Michelle White, for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
For further discussion, see Leland(1974).
2 Evenwithspanning, a number of papers derive different objectives for managers as a result of asym-
metricinformation(see e.g.Ross(1913)or Myers and Majluf(1984)), strategic considerations (see e.g.
FershtmanandJudd(1987)),or more generally the separation of ownershipandcontrol (see e.g. Jensen
andMeckling(1916)).
See Farrell (1985) and Manning(1988)fora discussion of theseconflicting incentives.
1may also own bonds issued by the firm. If so, they care what happens to bond values,
which lessens the conflict of interest between bondholders and stockholders. Shareholders
are also normally citizens of the country in which the finn is located, and therefore benefit
from any tax payments or charitable donations that the firm might make.
The implications of this argument are most striking if all shareholders are identical in
all respects and the economy is closed. In this case, each firm is owned equally by all
members of the economy. Managers, acting in the interests of shareholders, should there-
fore maximize efficiency.4 Spillovers (at least those which affect all shareholders equally)
will be internalized, monopoly power will not be used, and the public benefits arising from
extra tax payments will be taken into account.
If instead the model allows shareholders to differ, for example in their wealth and
tastes, will it forecast that firms should maximize their own share values, at least to a first
approximation, as is traditionally assumed? This is the question addressed in the paper.
It is easy to see that the model suggests not. For example, as long as wealthy individuals
maintain diversified portfolios, then they will want managers to take into account the
effects of their actions on the value of all other securities.
This story about the internalization of externalities and the offsetting benefits that arise
from tax payments is totally different from the story told in Bernheim and Bagwell(1988)
about the neutrality of all government policies.5 The Bernheim and Bagwell(1988) result
relies on altruism —peopletake into account effects on others because they care about
the welfare of others, directly or through its effects on the utility of people whose welfare
they do care about directly. In this paper, results depend simply on each individual taking
into account all the various ways he or she is affected directly by a firm's decisions: qua
shareholder, qua bondholder, qua consumer, and qua citizen.
In section 1, I explore the degree to which a firm, acting in the interests of shareholders,
should take into account the benefits it generates for others as a result of taies and direct
An exception would be actionswhich have different effects on different shareholders, e.g. localized
pollution. Deviations couldalsoarje with asymmetricinformation,as in the principal—agent literature.
It alsodiffers from the argument in Litzenberger and Tahnor (1988)thatrisk ingovernment policy
isirrelevant if security markets aresufficiently complete. They argue that investorscan then fully insure
themselves against random policy changes, since random policy creates no aggregate risk. The focus in
this paper is on theeffectsof nonstochastic policies.
2externalities. Several extensions of the model are also explored. Section 2 examines the
effects of competition among shareholders for control of the firm's behavior. Section 3
discusses how shareholders could design the manager's compensation scheme to induce
them to take into account the various ways that managerial decisions affect shareholders.
Finally, the last section summarizes the implications of these results for future work.
1. Equilibrium when managers act in the interests of shareholders
A. Basic model
This section develops a simple model to demonstrate the nature of the argument. The
implications of relaxing some of the critical assumptions are explored in sections 2 and 3.
The model requires several key features. First, individual portfolios must be diversified.
Assume therefore that the income of firms is risky, and that each firm has idiosyncratic
risk. For convenience, I will assume further that the separation theorem holds, so that
each investor divides his portfolio in some proportion between riskless bonds and a share
in the market portfolio of risky equity.
Second, if uniform taxes are to affect allocation decisions, there must be some alterna-
tive to physical investment. Rather than introducing a consumption vs. savings decision,
I instead assume that the country can invest abroad in risk—free bonds earning a rate of
return r.
Third, in order to examine the degree to which firing take into account the benefits to
society resulting from extra corporate tax payments, both sides of the government budget
must appear explicitly in the model. To keep things simple, let there be a proportional tax
at rater on the income of firms, at the same rate for all firms. Let the resulting revenue be
used to finance transfer payments to individuals in the society, with individual i receiving
the fraction floftotal tax revenue, where Eflu=1.6
6 If thegovernment uses tax revenue to finance publicly providedgoods ratherthan transfer payments,
then fi can be reinterpreted to describe the doQartransferwhichprovides thesame utility that individual
i derives from an extra dollarspentonthese goods.In this case, however, E1fineed not equal one. See
Atkinson and Stern(1974)fora derivation of the equilibrium valueof E assuming the government
maximizes anadditive socialwelfare function.
3The specific set—up of the model is as follows: there is one good, two periods, F firms,
and I individuals. The price of the one good will be the numeraire, and all firms are
assumed to take this price as given. Firm f starts out with initial assets K}, derived
perhaps from past capital investments. These can be retained and invested in productive
capital or paid out as dividends to shareholders in the first period. Let K1 denote the
amount retained as productive capital, so that K) —K1denotes initial dividend pay-
ments.7 Fbr simplicity, assume that capital does not depreciate. Let K denote the vector,
of length F, of the amount of productive capital in each firm, so that K = (K1, ..,Kr).
In the second period, the firm receives profits O1irj(K), where Oj is stochastic. Here, I
capture any externalities across firms by allowing the profits of each firm to depend on
the capital investment decisions made by all finns. Since Kj is the only choice variable
for each firm, this formulation is perfectly general. At the end of the second period, each
firm shuts down, paying out its capital stock plus its after—tax profits as a dividend to
shareholders. Dividend payments to the finn's shareholders in the second period equal
= K1 + U1ir1(K)(l —r).Let * =U1irj denote aggregate pre—tax profits.
In the first period, I assume that each individual i divides his initial assets, W1,5 between
nskless bonds and shares in each of the firms. In particular, assume that individual i buys
the fraction a, of each firm f. Any remaining assets, plus initial dividend payments, are
invested in riskiess bonds. Individual i's holdings of riskless bonds are denoted by B1,
and the initial market value of the shares of firm f is denoted by Vj. The first period
budget constraint is therefore W1 = E,aq(Vjr
—D,)+ B1. During the second period,
each individual consumes all his assets along with any transfer payments he receives from
the government. Therefore, second period consumption of individual i, denoted C1, equals
C, =B,(1+r)+ cwjb+flar*. (1)
/
In making decisions, the individual acts so as to maximize ex ante utility, denoted by
EU(C1). Optimal portfolio choice implies that individual i should be indifferent to a small
For simplicity, I ignore here the implicit constraint that D}?0, and ignore sources of finance other
than foregone dividends.
8Initialassets in part consist of initial ownership of equity in the various firms. These claims are then
traded on the market during the first period.
4shift in assets from equity in firm f to bonds. Differentiatingutility with respect to a11,
and taking account of how bond holdings must adjust to satisfy the firstperiod budget
constraint, yields the first—order condition
(1 + r)EUI = EU[K, + Jjirj(1 —r)J/Vjr. (2)
This equation implies that E(U1'U1)/EU has the same value for all i. This ratiosimply
equals the certainty equivalent to the lottery 8,. Denote this common value byR1. The
above assumption that the separation theorem holds, so that individuals divide theirport-
folios between riskiess bonds and the market portfolio of risky securities, implies thata1
has the same value for all f. Denote this common value bya1.
When firms make investment decisions, they face the complication that shareholders'
preferences about the appropriate investment level vary. I assume that the firm follows the
preferences of the median shareholder, and ignore any possibleagency problems. Further-
more, I assume that there are sufficiently many shareholders with the same preferences as
that of the median shareholder that no single shareholder is in a position tochange the
firm's behavior through changing his portfolio choices.9
In general, the median shareholder can differ by firm. Each firm chooses thecapital
stock that maximizes the utility of the median shareholder, taking as given the choices
made by the median shareholders in other firms. I therefore examine a Nash equilibrium.
If individual i were the median shareholder in firmg, what capital stock would the firm
choose? A marginal change in K9, given the capital stocks in the other firms,causes the
expected utility of individual i to change by
8t=E{u:ai{_r+>o4jL(l_r)] +Uflero4-}.
(3)
Because of the extra capital investment, a smaller dividend is paid in the first period, low-
ering investments in bonds. Therefore in the second period, the individual has less interest
income, but higher dividend income and higher transfer payments from the government,
I return to this issue in section 2.
5funded by the tax payments on the income arising from the extra capital, leading to the
three terms in equation (3). Individual i views firm g's capital stock as optimal if and only
if equation (3) equals zero, which implies that
(1_r(l_7e))>R1P1_=r. (4a)
1
Here,y- =/3€/i, anddescribes individual i's share in government revenue relative to his
share of corporate dividends. It measures the fraction of the dividends that he lost due
to corporate taxes that he gets back through increased transfer payments. Equation (4a)
implies that shareholders differ in their preferences for the capital stock of each firm only
because of differences in 7.Themedian value of among shareholders then determines
the firm's capital stock. Because each shareholder is assumed to buy the market portfolio,
this median value is the same for each finn. If individual i is this median individual, then
he determines the capital stock in each firm, based on thesummary of his preferences
expressed in equation (4a).
In contrast, the standard approach in the literature is to assume that investment in
firm g continues as long as the market is willing topay at least a dollar for the returns
from an extra dollar invested in the firm. This implies that
(1 —r)R,=r. (4b)
If spillovers across firms can be ignored, and if 0, then equation (4a) simplifies to
equation (4b). The standard approach implicitly assumes that a firm's shareholdersreceive
back as benefits from government expendituresa trivial fraction of the firm's tax payments,
and that these shareholders do not care what happens tocompeting firms. This story may
be an appropriate description of the situation ofowners of a closely held firm. However,
since each investor in a publicly traded corporationowns only a small fraction of that firm,
effects of that firm's actions on other firmsor on tax revenue no longer look small relative to
the direct effects on the value of that investor's shares in the firm.As a result, investment
decisions become more complicated,as can be seen comparing equations (4a) and (4b).
How does the allocation described byequation (4a) differ from the adent allocation?
Suppose the government can choose the capital stock in each firm and makelump-sum
6transfers among individuals so as to maximize the utility of the first individual, while
maintaining the utility levels of all other individuals at least at the utility achieved in the
above allocation. Then it is straight—forward to show that the resulting capital stock in
firm g will be characterized by
(5)
Comparing equations (4a) and (5), two conclusions are immediately apparent. First,
firms acting in the interests of shareholders will fully take into account any externalities
they impose on other firms —shareholdersown a proportional amount of all firms, and
so they care only about aggregate profits. This condusions does not depend on the initial
wealth distribution.
Second, taxes distort investment decisions only to the degree to which fl1/a11 for
the median shareholder. If all individuals in the initial population are identical, then
fl= afor all i, implying that taxes are nondistorting —newcapital investments lead
to extra tax payments but also lead to increased transfer payments of equal size, and the
two effects just offset. Only to the degree to which revenue from corporate investments
is redistributed does the corporate tax distort behavior. Depending on the pattern of
this redistribution, the tax may either discourage or encourage capital investments. For
example, if the initial shareholders include foreign investors, but only domestic investors
receive transfer payments, then the median shareholder, assuming he is domestic, could
well receive a larger share of tax payments back in transfers than he implicitly pays initially
as an owner of corporate shares. In this case the corporate tax encourages capital invest-
ments, since fl> a1.Shareholding is in fact heavily concentrated among few individuals,
however, whereas benefits from government expenditures are much more widely dispersed
in the population. As a result, a- >>fi,, sothat the effective tax distortion may be well
approximated by the statutoiy tax rate.
In the U.S., the link between specific taxes and specific expenditures is quite weak. This
is particularly true for the corporate income tax, which makes it difficult to forecast how
extra corporate tax revenue will be spent. To the degree that specific taxes are linked to
specific expenditures, however, this forecasting becomes easier. For example, since Social
Security benefits are linked to the payroll tax, extra corporate tax revenues will not be used
7to finance extra Social Security benefits. Our results suggest that if corporate tax revenues
were linked to expenditures benefiting corporate shareholders, then the tax distortion to
investment decisions would be greatly reduced. For example, suppose increased corporate
tax revenues were to be used to reduce tax rates on highincome individuals, who according
to the data own most corporate equity.'° Then these shareholders would push publicly
held finns to pay less attention to the tax implications of their actions. Such an implicit
tie between corporate tax revenues and the progressivity of the personal income tax is not
entirely implausible. The model in this paper suggests that an explicit tie, or at least a
regular association, could have important effects on corporate behavior.
In general, corporate decisions will become increasingly inefficient as the preferences
of the median shareholder diverge from the average preferences of citizens. Even if all in-
dividuals own equalamounts of equity, if their preferences otherwise differ then decisions
based on the median "voter" will not in general be efficient as emphasized by Buchanan
and T¼illock(1962). For example, suppose only the few shareholders living near the firm
are affected by its pollution emissions. Then the firm, following the preferences of the me-
dian shareholder, will not take adequate account of these costs.11 When individuals own
different amounts of equity, the potential for inefficient decisions is much larger. These
differences in equity holdings may arise due to wealth differences, tax distortions to port-
folio choice, or simply differences in risk tolerance. As a result, any policy change which
leads to less inequality in equity holdings may cause increased efficiency of corporate deci-
sions. In this respect, income redistribution should improve the efficiency of the economy,
as should a reduction in tax distortions to portfolio composition, e.g. eliminating the
favorable treatment of capital gains.
Not all firms are corporations, and not all corporations have shares which are publicly
traded. The above results apply only to publicly traded corporations. In contrast, closely
10 This isessentially what was done by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Treasury's stated intent in
this Act was to design a distributionally neutral set of tax changes. The argument here requires that the
pattern of redistribution in the tax system be held fixed over time through suitable readjustments of tax
rates.
Changes in policy which improve the environment over a much larger geographical area, audi as cuts
in the production of fluorocarbons, are more likely to be supported by the median shareholder, however.
Sheld firms normally have very few owners, with each owner investing a substantial fraction
of his or her portfolio in the firm. These owners of a closely held firm care primarily about
the value of their firm. As a result, implications of the firm's actions for the value of other
finns, Or for government tax revenue, would effectively be ignored. While other concerns
of the owners of a closely held firm, e.g. the welfare of the community in which they live,
could well enter into the firm's decisions, their heavy investment in the firm suggests that
as a first approximation they simply maximize the equivalent of own share value.
According to the above model, publicly traded corporations should pursue different
objectives than closely held firms. Whether or not publicly traded corporations behave
more efficiently than closely held firms depends on the degree to which their efficiency—
reducing incentive to exploit the combined monopoly power of the publicly traded firms
in each industry is outweighed by their efficiency—increasing incentive to take account of
other externalities and of the benefits financed by their tax payments.
B. Extensions
Monopoly power
This basic model can be extended to address a variety of related corporate decisions.
The above model implies that firms will take into account any externalities they impose
on other firms. But if firms attempt to maximize joint profits, then they have an incentive
to collude and charge the monopoly price. In extending the above model to address this
question, however, the fact that shareholders may also be consumers of the firms' output
must be taken into account. Shareholders qua consumers are hurt by any increase in the
price of the firms' output, which reduces the price they want the firms to charge. This
point has been developed in Thrrell(1985) and Manning(1988).
Debt finance
The above model did not allow for debt finance. The traditional approach to modeling
debt vs. equity decisions12 is to argue that increased use of debt lowers taxes, because
12 See, for example1Gordon andMalkiel(1981).
9interest payments but not dividends are deductible from corporate taxable income. How-
ever, increased use of debt also raises the probability of bankruptcy, which has real costs.
These real costs arise in large part due to conflicts of interest between different classes
of creditors, which can lead to drawn out legal proceedings and decisions benefiting some
classes of creditors at the expense of others.'3 Conflicts of interest between different cred-
itors can also create agency costs prior to bankruptcy.'4 The firm trades off these various
costs of extra debt against any tax savings to determine the firm's debt-equity ratio. If
corporate debt were introduced into the above model, but the model were otherwise left
unchanged, then this debt would be risky in equilibrium and so would be part of the mar-
ket portfolio of risky securities. Individual iwouldtherefore own the fraction a of both
the equity and the debt issued by each firm. As a result, each shareholder would want the
firm to ignore any conificts of interest between debt and equity. Without the agency costs
and bankruptcy costs that arise from the conflict of interest between different classes of
creditors, debt finance would be less costly at the margin and more debt would be used.
This story may well explain why debt—equity ratios are much higher in Japan than in
the U.S. In Japan, both equity .and debt are heavily owned by a few large banks. Since the
same banks own both securities, they want the firm to maximize firm value rather than
equity value. In the U.S., in contrast, debt and equity holdings are heavily segmented,
since the advantageous personal tax treatment of capital gains on equity is of much higher
value to those in high tax brackets.'5 Conflicts of interest between debt and equity are
therefore much more important, with the resulting agenty and bankruptcy costs. As a
result, less debt is used.
Charitabledonations
See, forexample, Bulow andShoven(1978)and White(1989).
14 Standard referencesare Jensen and Meckling(1976) and Myers(1977).
Note, however, that in the U.S. corporate bonds are owned mainly by banks, insurance companies,
and defined benefit pension plans. Since the return on these bonds ultimately belongs to the shareholders
intheseinstitutions,and not depositors, policy holders, or pension recipients, equity holders do own
considerable corporatebonds.
10This model may also provide an explanation for why corporations donatemoney to
charity. By the logic of the above model, the firm would take into account any utility
shareholders receive from funds donated to charity. Having the firm, rather than share-
holders, donate money has two advantages. First, if the effective tax rate on corporate
income is higher than that on personal income, then the tax savings are larger. More
importantly, the firm can solve the free—rider problem among individual corporate share-
holders by donating for all of them simultaneously.16 Similarly, corporationsmay accept
restrictions on their behavior, such as the Sullivan rules which restrict the nature of their
actions in South Africa, because their shareholders care about more than just share values,
and not because of other outside pressures.
2. Competition for Control of Corporations
In the above model, I assumed that there were enough shareholders with identical char-
acteristics to those of the median shareholder that no one shareholder's behavior could
affect the characteristics of the median shareholder. Through this assumption, I was able
to avoid dealing with competition among shareholders for control of a firm. Yet, when
shareholder preferences differ, control is valuable, giving shareholders an incentive to alter
their portfolios in order to influence a firm's behavior. For example, there is an incentive
for a small group of individuals who care little about other implications of the firm's ac-
tions (e.g. for whom a >> $)totake over the finn, shift its behavior to that of share
value maximization, and thereby profit substantially from the resulting capital gains.'7
Does the above model merely forecast that ownership will become concentrated, so as to
insure that the firm maximizes share values?
In this section, I argue that while such takeovers may happen, perhaps in the form of
leveraged buyouts, there are strong forces preserving public ownership. To begin with, the
16SeeHochman andRogers(1969) for a justification for governmentdonations as an alternative solution
tothefree—rider problem.
A small group who cared strongly about other implications of the firm's actions could also attempt
to take over the firm. However, as a result of their investing heavily in the firm's shares, they will end up
:weighting heavily what happens to share values when making decisions, and so should end up behaving
approximately like share value maximizers. Note also that if a firm were taken over by another publicly
owned corporation, the incentives of the owners would not change.
11optimal allocation of risk—bearing argues for broad ownership, so that a takeover by a small
group increases the costs of risk—bearing.'8 In addition, current regulations prevent a small
group from acquiring more than five percent of a firm's shares anonymously. But if the
group must announce publicly its attempt to acquire more shares, then those contemplating
selling shares will sell only at a price at least as high as the price they expect to prevail later.
If their expectations are rational, then the small group cannot profit on the shares they
purchase publicly, confining their profits to the five percent of shares acquired anonymously.
Finally, those selling shares should realize that their sales in particular will cause some shift
in the firm's behavior.'9 Those who find this shift undesirable will be more reluctant to
sell.
In order to see more clearly the confficting pressures, consider first the case of anony-
mous trading in a firm's shares. Previously, I assumed that each shareholder's assets were
too small to allow the shareholder to affect the characteristics of the median shareholder
in any firm through his or her own portfolio choices, resulting in the first—order condi-
tion characterizing optimal portfolio choice described by equation (2). If the shareholder's
portfolio choices do affect the firm's behavior, then the first-order conditions for optimal
portfolio choice would need to take into account these effects, with all the ramifications
they might have for the utility of the shareholder. Optimal portfolios may no longer be
balanced. Just as the median shareholder in firm f was assumed to take as given the
capital stocks chosen by other finns when making decisions, I assume as well that any
investor contemplating investing more in firm f takes as given the capital stocks chosen
by other firms. Under these assumptions, the first-order conditions for optimal portfolio
choice become
Vf(l + r)EU =Eu(I<1 + U11r1(l
—r)] +°7'
LfL (2a)
If there were both votingandnonvotingstock,then a takeover of control no longer necesrily implies
mefficient risk—bearing. Also, if the finn could be subdivided into many identical smaller firms, with no
loss in efficiency, then each of these could be owned by a smallgroup without extra risk—bearing costs.
Many papers in the literature on takeovers follow Grossman—Hart(1980) in assuming that each outside
shareholder is so small relative to the market that he ignores any effects of his actions on market outcomes.
Since in the above model, shareholders can explicitly affect the firm's behavior through their votes, for
consistency I allow them to take into account this fact in their portfolio decisions as well.
12Here, OEU1/0K1 is given by equation (3); it would equal zero in equilibrium for the median
shareholder in firm f, but could potentially be large and of either sign for shareholders
with extreme preferences.
What determines 8K1/8a11? Within the model, a shareholder can affect K1 only by
changing the characteristics of the median shareholder. Therefore, one factor affecting the
value of buying a share is the preferences of the seller of the share. If the seller's preferences
are on the same side of the median preferences as that of the buyer, the transaction has no
effect on the characteristics of the median shareholder; if the seller's preferences areon the
other side of the median, then the purchase changes the median shareholder in the desired
direction. When buying (selling) shares, hosver, an investor does not normally know
anything about the preferences of the seller (buyer). In order to maintain this anonymity
of trade, I assume there is a small and equal probability that each shareholder must alter
his holdings by a given percent, either up or down, for reasons outside of the model.2°
Therefore, in any equilibrium, balanced trade would continue to occur, with no effect on
market prices.
-
Aninitial allocation will be viewed to be an equilibrium if, starting from this allocation,
no trade occurs except where required under the above assumption. If, starting from such
an allocation, an investor considers buying an extra share, there is an equal likelihood that
the seller will be above vs. below the median. Therefore, half the time the transaction
will move the median in the desired direction. The size of the movement is determined by
the density of shareholders around the median in the initial allocation. If this density is
"thinner", then OK1/&x11 will be larger in absolute value, and always of the same sign
as e9U/8Kj. Since the size of OK,/Oaq would be the same for any investor on the same
side of the median, the last term in equation (2a) will be zero for the median shareholder,
positive for all other shareholders, and larger the further the shareholder's preferences are
from those of the median shareholder. Therefore, the desire to change the firm's actions
raises the value of a share beyond what can be explained based on the return distribution
of the existing shares (described by the first term on the right—hand side of equation (2a)).
20SeeKyle(1085) for a careful application of an analogous assumption to a different problem.
13As a result, an equilibrium share price will be higher than the price forecast based on this
return distribution alone, due to the value shareholders attach to control. Also, ownership
will be more concentrated among those who care more about changing the firm's actions
(those with extreme preferences) than would be forecast based on risk preferences alone.
The equilibrium may not be unique, however. The formal characterization of the
equilibrium is more complicated than in the standard portfolio framework because the
value of a share to an individual depends on who else owns shares as well as on the
share's return distribution. To see the possibility of multiple equilibria, assume that p is
an equilibrium price for a firm's shares. If the price had been slightly higher, then those
with preferences near the median (for whom the second term in equation (2a) is near zero),
would demand fewer shares. The resulting thinner distribution of shareholders around the
median raises the value of extra purchases for those with extreme preferences, potentially
justifying the higher price.
The analysis of a public offer for shares in the firm, by a raider who already owns at
least five percent of the firm's shares, would face similar complications. What would be
the response of existing shareholders to any given bid price? Each shareholder would need
to forecast the future return distribution for the firm's shares, given the distribution of
ownership that results from the bid and its implications for the firm's behavior. Given this
distribution, sales would be determined by equation (2a). For tendering shhreholders whose
preferences are on the same side of the resulting median as those of the raider, sales to the
raider have no effect on the characteristics of the median voter, so that 8K1/Oaq =0.For
these shareholders, sales decisions would be based simply on the share's return distribution.
Shareholders whose preferences are on the opposite side of the median would be more
reluctant to sell because of the adverse effect on the behavior of the firm.
Surprisingly, the total number of shares acquired does not necessarily go up as the bid
price increases. Certainly, the price rise has to be more than large enough relative to any
improvement in future profits to make it attractive for anyone to sell more shares If so,
then those whose preferences are on the same side of the medianas those of the raider, and
those near enough to the median that they are roughly indifferent toany resulting changes
14in the firm's behavior,2' would tender more shares. However, the resulting thinner distri-
bution of shareholders around the median implies that any sale by remaining shareholders
has a larger effect on the location of the median shareholder, leading to a larger adverse
change in the behavior of the firm from their perspective. This extra cost of selling shares
could well outweigh the advantage of the higher price, causing remaining shareholders to
sell fewer shares in response to the higher price. It is even possible that fewer shares would
be sold in total. What is clear, however, is that the higher price leads to share ownership
being more concentrated among those with extreme preferences.
What bid price would the raider prefer? Due to the misallocation of risk that results
from a concentration of ownership, the return distribution on each share would be more
valuable to outside investors than to the raider. Investors whose preferences are on the
other side df the median will value shares in addition as a way to limit the behavioral
changes desired by the raider. As a result, given rational expectations on the part of
outside investors, the raider would need to pay more per share than the resulting return
distribution per se would be worth to him. These losses would be larger the larger the
share of the firm that the raider acquires. But the larger the number of shares acquired,
the larger the change in the behavior of the firm, until the raider acquires half the shares.
At that point, any further acquisitions have no effect on the behavior of the firm, so would
not be desirable given the increased costs of risk—bearing.
For a bid to be worthwhile, any gains to the raider from the change in behavior must
be large enough to offset the losses incurred on the shares purchased publicly. What gains
would occur? Any change in behavior causes an increase in the value of any shares the
raider acquired before publicly announcing his intention to buy shares. If the raider gains
full control of the firm, then he may also be able to take profits directly, rather than sharing
profits proportionately among all shareholders.22 Finally, the raider may care about the
behavior of the firm frr reasons other than its effect on the share value of that firm. Since
21 The median shareholderby construction is indifferentat the margin to any change in the firm's
behavior.
22 Thesewere the types of gains pointed out in Grossman and Hartfl98O) that provided the incentive
for takeovers. They ignoredtheoffsetting lossesdescñbedhere, however.
15both gains and losses increase as the raider acquires more shares, the optimal bid (if any)
depends on the magnitudes of the gains and losses.
How likely are equilibria with concentrated ownership? Concentrated ownership implies
higher costs of risk-bearing, implying that larger and riskier companies are less likely to
be owned by small groups. This suggests that firms will initially go public only when they
become too large to be owned comfortably by a small group. When they do go public, our
model implies that the objectives of the firm are likely to change. To the degree to which
this shift in firm behavior results in a fall in share values, it becomes more expensive for the
initial owners to take the firm public. The shift in finn behavior need not necessarily result
in a fallinshare prices, however, lithe rest of the industry is already publicly owned, then
selling this firm to the same group of shareholders may result in greater monopoly profits
for the industry as a whole, and possibly for this firm as well. In addition,agency costs may
be lower when both the firm's equity and the firm's debt are owned by the same investors,
and these reduced costs would be reflected in share prices, If the price of a publicly owned
finn were high enough relative to that resulting from share—value-maximizing behavior,
then private ownership would not be an equilibrium.
Perhaps leveraged buyouts can be understood in part as shifts to share-value—maximizing
behavior. Certainly, managers are normally under much morepressure to maximize profits
after a leveraged buyout. In fact, existing statistical work does indicate that profits tend
to rise after a buyout, and that public shareholders are normally paid a sizable premium
when finns go private.23 These buyouts are noteasy to explain using conventional mod-
els. For example, any benefits from extra interest deductions could have been obtained
earlier, and extra leverage does not require a buyout.24 Also, the shift in the manager's
incentive package could equally well have been arranged earlier underpublic ownership.25
The hypothesis here is that it did not occur under publicownership because the public
23
See,(or example, Kaplan(198s) and DeAngelo,DeAngelo, and Rice(1984).
24
Jens(1986)has argued that extra debtalsolessens agency costs, particularly (or firms with free cash
flow. This gain does not seem to require takinga firm private, however.
25 Another
proposed gain from taking a firm private is reduced registration, listing, and other shareholder
servicing costs. This will be mqre important for smaller finns.
16owners had more complicated objectives, and that the shift toprivate ownership enabled
the managers to ignore these other objectives, therebyincreasing profits.
3. Implications for Managerial Incentives
Ultimately, the behavior of the firm depends on the incentives faced by themanager. In
the above discussion, managers were simply assumed topursue the objectives desired by
shareholders. But, as emphasized in the principal—agent literature, shareholders'ability
to induce a manager to act in their interests is limited by the amount of informationthey
have about the actions of the manager. Much work has been doneattempting to derive
plausible characteristics of a manager's compensation package, assuming shareholderscare
only about maximization of share values. If shareholders have more complicated objectives,
how does the forecasted compensation package change? What can observed forms of
managerial compensation tell us about the objectives of shareholders?
If the principal's objective were maximization of share values and therewere no risk,
then managerial compensation would simply be based on share values (assuming that the
manager's effort is not observable directly). Providing adequate incentives to put in effort
requires that the manager keep all changes in the aggregate value of the firm. The problem
that arises in doing this is that share values depend on more than just the manager's effort
level, and it is difficult to control for the effects of these other factors. Without such
controls, the manager ends up facing substantial risk, which creates its own efficiency
costs. As a result, optimal compensation packages pay the manager less than all changes
in the aggregate value of the firm in order to reduce these risk—bearing costs.
A potentially important outside factor affecting share values is shifts in demand for
products of the industry as a whole, which in principle affect all firms in the industry
in equal proportions.26 One way to control for the effects of this factor is to base the
pay of the manager on the performance of his/hr firm relative to that of other firms
in the industry.2' This can be. done directly, by basingpay on relative performance, or
26
Unexpectedtax changes andbusiness cycles would also likelyaffect all finns in the industrypropor-
tionately.
27
See,for example, Holmstrom(19$2) for a formal derivation of this type of pay scheme.
17alternatively by requiring the manager to hold a portfolio long in the stock of his own firm
and short in stock of other firms in the industry.28
If the objectives of the principal were to maximize the value of the market portfolio,
however, as was the case above if 0 for the median shareholder, how would shareholders
want to design the incentives faced by the manager? Without uncertainty, the manager's
pay wthld be based on the performance of the market portfolio. With uncertainty, the
optimal compensation scheme would now indude a less short position in other shares, or
perhaps even a long position. The specific amount would depend on the degree to which
the manager can influence the values of these other firms.
To see this in a simple example, I extend a special case of the model in Holmstrom(1982)
in order to incorporate spillovers. In his model, shareholders want to motivate themanager
to exert effort. Since they cannot observe his effort directly they instead base hispay on
observed share values, which are affected by his effort. In particular, assume that the
effort by the manager of firm f, denoted bye,, affects not only the value of firm f but
also the values of all N —1other finns in the industry. Assume in addition that there is
a common risk factor, v, affecting equally all firms in the industry, as well as independent
idiosyncratic risk factors, pj, affecting separately each firm f. Specifically, let the ex post
value of firm f in period 2, denoted 1'), equal
V7=ei+SLeg+zi+pi. (6)
9$!
Assumethat these risk factors are distributed normally with zero mean. The variance of
u is denoted a' and the variance of each of theMi is denoted s.
Assume that the pay of themanager of firm f, WI,canbe expressed as a linear function
of the values of each of the shares, so thatW,= a+ 1W1 + cV, where V =
28 Under theseschemes, the manager should in principle be prevented from trading freely in equity. In
particular, the pnncapaJ would want to prevent the manager from trading on inside information, since such
trades can produce profits of arbitrary size, therebyproviding an incentive to generate new information
regardless of its effects on the value of shares in the firm. While insida trading rulescover trade in the
stock of one's own firm, however, they do not restrict trade in the share in other firms whosevalue might be affected by the manager's actions.
"Holmstromdid not impose any functional form assumptions here. This restriction is imposed to
simplify the discussion.
18Thilowing Holmstrom's assumption that the risk factors are distributed normally, theutility
of the manager, Uj, can be expressed as a function of themean and variance of w, as well
as the effort level of the manager. In particular, assume that U1 =U(E(wj),var(w1),ejr).
Let(I denote the derivative of U1 with respect to its i'th argument. Themanager chooses
e, to maximize U1, implying that the first-order condition characterizing the optimal value
of ej is
U1(b + c(1 + (N —1)6)/N]—U3(e1). (7)
Assume that the manager can obtain utility Uelsewhere,so accepts this position if and
only if U1 ￿U.
For simplicity, assume that shareholders are risk neutral. Shareholders then determine
the pay of the manager of firm f by maximizing E,El';
—wjwith respect to a, b, and c.
They do so subject to the constraints that U1 ￿ U and thatq satisfy equation (7). The
resulting first—order conditions imply that
and (Sa)
c =(6s —(1 —6)c)A,implying that (Sb)
6c+s/N
(Sc) c
Rere, A > o.°If6 =0,so that spillovers can beignored, then the optimal compensation
scheme has c —b for large N, implying that themanager would be paid based approx-
imately on relative performance, following the results in Hohustrom. In general, b ￿ 0,
while c 0 ifS ￿ c/fr + s) but is positive otherwise. ForE cc/fr+ s), —b/c increases as
6 increases, implying that the compensation scheme is based more heavily on own share
prices, though pay still depends negatively to some extent on industry performance. For
yet larger 6, however, manager's pay depends positively on industry performance, and in
the limit when 6 =1it depends only on industry performance.
In a recent study of the compensation of 2214 executives in 1295 different corporations,
Gibbons and Murphy(1989) regress the compensation of eachmanager on the rate of
30 To becomplete, A =(Ocj/8c)(1 +(N—1)6)/{(Oej/Oe)[(1 + (N—1)52)s+(N —1)(1 —6)'el —2U3(1+
(N —1)5)fr+ s/N)s}.
19return earned on their own firm's shares and on the rate of return earned on both the
market portfolio and an industry portfolio. Not surprisingly, the return on the firm's own
shares has a positive effect on the manager's compensation. In contrast, the return on the
market portfolio has a negative effect on the manager's compensation, and its coefficient
is roughly comparable in absolute value to that on the firm's rate of return, suggesting
that compensation is based on the firm's performance relative to the market. The above
theory would forecast this if the manager's actions have little impact on the. market as a
whole. However, the coefficient on the industry portfolio is close to zero. The above theory
would forecast that c=0if spillovers within the industry are sufficiently important. This
coefficient seems difficult to explain otherwise.3' In addition, compensation is only one
component of a manager's total income, which also includes the return on stock options
and income from the manager's personal stockholdings in both the manager's own finn
and in other firms. Therefore, total income should be based yet more heavily on the return
to the firm and less negatively on the performance of the industry. These compensation
schemes are much more easily understood if shareholders care about the value of the market
portfolio, and not just the value of the shares in this one firm.
Therefore, once the principal—agent problem is added to the previous model, the theory
no longer forecasts that managers take full account of the effects of externalities their
actions generate. If the pay of managers does not depend on the performance ofcompeting
firms, then managers would ignore spillovers entirely. In contrast, however, if shareholders
in a firm care only about the value of that firm's shares, then thetheory forecasts that
managers should have an incentive to undermine the performance of competitors, contrary
to the above empirical results.
How might shareholders push the firm to take into accountany benefits they receive
from the firm's tax payments? Whencompensation is based solely on share values, taxes
should cause managers to invest less. If shareholders wishto offset this incentive, they
can reward the manager based not only on share values but alsoon the size of the firm.
Gibbons and Murphy attempt to explain this anomaly byclaimingthatindustry definitions are likely to be noisy,biasing the coefficienttowards zero. However, they find similar results using much broader
industry definitions.
20Managers of large firms as a rule do get paid more thanmanagers of small firms. This
dependence of pay on the size of the firm could easily bemanipulated by shareholders to
create the desired overall investment incentives, though it doesnot correct tax distortions
to the type of investment (such as structures vs.equipment).
Other more complicated ways in which themanager's actions affect the utility of share-
holders may be hard to incorporate directly into themanager's compensation scheme. For
example, how could the manager be induced to take into account the benefitsto sharéhold-
ers from charitable donations, or the degree to which shareholdersare also bondholders,
and therefore prefer that managers maximize firm value ratherthan equity value? One
answer is that the boards of directors could push managers to take thesemore complicated
effects of their actions into account. Often, forexample, major lenders to the firm place a
representative on the firm's board of directors. Managers of other firms whichare strongly
affected by this firm's actions might also beput on the board. Another way to provide
these incentives is through the threat of shareholder initiativesor corporate takeovers —
shareholdersmight be willing to tender shares to a raider who promises the desired policies
even if the offered price is not otherwise attractive.
4. Conclusions -
Byassuming that firms act to maximize their own share values, traditional models of
corporate behavior implicitly assume that the only systematicway in which a firm's actions
affect the welfare of its shareholders is through effectson its own share values. However, a
firm's shareholders may also be affected by the firm's decisions in theirroles as shareholders
in other firms, as lenders to the firm, asconsumers of the firm's products, as people
hurt by the pollution emitted by the firm, andeven as citizens who benefit from the
expenditures financed by the firm's taxes, if these effects are large enough, and if they affect
a large enough share of the firm's shareholders, then the assumption that firms act in the
interests of shareholders no longer implies share value maximization. Theimplied changes
in the forecasted behavior of the firm couldeasily challenge many standard conclusions.
In practice, how important are these otherways in which shareholders are affected by a
firm's actions, and what implications would these effects have for theforecasted behavior
of the firm?
21To begin with, standard models of portfolio choice forecast that equity holders invest
proportionally in the shares of all publicly traded firms.32 This implies that equity holders
want each firm to take full account of all the ways in which its actions affect the value of
other firms in the economy. Such externalities could arise from a spillover of information,
e.g. from R&D or from attempts to market new products. They could also arise from com-
petitive actions that lower industry profits, such as charging a price below the monopoly
price or advertising to raise own profits at the expense of industry profits. If firms do
take these spifiovers into account, then collusion among existing firms would, become much
easier since firms would not focus on how market shares are divided among the firms in the
industry Even breaking up firms through antitrust policy would prove to be ineffective.
How successfully can shareholders design the incentive package of managers to induce
them to maximize aggregate profits? Inorderto induce managers to take into account
such spiliovers, shareholders want to reward managers for actions which raise the value
of competing firms. As Uolmstrom(1983) shows, however, when shareholders care only
about own share values, the optimal compensation scheme bases the pay of managers on
the firm's performance relative to that of competing firms in the industry, so penalizes the
manager for raising the share values of competing finns. Had shareholders instead cared
about the value of the market portfolio, then the optimal compensation scheme would im-
pose less of a penalty for successful performance of competitors, or even some reward. In
practice, Gibbons and Murphy(1989) find that the pay of managers is not affected by the
performance of competing firms. This observation is much easier to understand if share-
holders do indeed care about the value of the market portfolio rather than just the value of
that firm's shares. However, with this pay scheme, managers have no incentive to internal-
ize spillovers, in spite of the underlying objectives of shareholders —theprincipal—agent
problem seems to undermine the ability of shareholders to induce managers to collude.
Ignoring tax and regulatory distortions to portfolio composition,33 standard models
also forecast that investors will invest proportionately in all risky securities, implying that
32
Tax distortions, however, may lead high tax rate individuals to favor shares in finns with a low dividend
payout rate, though these effects do not seem large. Historically, brokerage fees may have made it cheaper
to invest in fewerfirms,though now mutual funth should make it cheaper to invest in the market portfolio.
Bank regulations, for example, allow banks to invest much more easily in debt than in equity.
22they would buy in equal proportion all the securities issued byany given firm. As a result,
investors would care only about total firm value, and notjust about the value of equity.
This suggests that the seeming importance of the conflict of interestbetween different
classes of creditors in the U.S. arises fromgovernment policies which distort portfolio
choice rather than from any more fundamental aspect of theoperation of publicly traded
corporations. In fact, in countries like Japan in which both corporate equity andcorporate
bonds are heavily owned by a few large banks, conflicts of interest betweendifferent classes
of creditors seem much less important. Therefore, changes in thesetax and regulatory
distortions to portfolio composition may have more far reaching effects than isnormally
thought.
To what degree would shareholders take into account the increasedgovernment ex-
pendlitures financed by each firm's tax payments? In a homogeneouscountry, in which
shareholders are representative of the population as a whole, they would benefitequally
from money the firm pays them directly andmoney the firm pays in taxes, which they
then receive indirectly as citizens, implying that they would want the firm to maximize
pre—tax profits. Even if shareholders are highly unrepresentative of the population as a
whole, as in the U.S., they would value profits paid in taxes to the government to the ex-
tent that these taxes are earmarked for expenditures or personal tax reductions that favor
shareholders. For example, if the overall progressivity of the tax system as traditionally
measured is held fixed as a matter of policy, then extra corporate tax payments should
lead to a reduction in taxes on wealthy individuals. In thiscase, shareholders would wish
the firm to take into account the benefits they receive as a result of extracorporate tax
payments. To what extent this earmarking is perceived to occu.ir is subject to debate. In
principle, such earmarking could have important effects on the behavior of publicly traded
corporations.
Finally, shareholders are also customers of the firm. Ignoring this fact, the publicly
traded finns within each industry, acting in the interests of their shareholders, should take
full advantage of their collective marketpower. However, the larger the fraction of their
output that is purchased by their own shareholders, the less willing they should be to
exploit this monopoly power. If shareholders are primarily domestic citizens, for example,
23then export-oriented firms should be more willing to exploit market power than firms that
sell domestically.
AU of these arguments apply only to publicly traded corporations. Since ownership of
other firms is typically concentrated among very few individuals, these firms are likely to
maidmize share values. The model therefore predicts that publicly traded firms pursue
different objectives than closely held firms. When firms change status, e.g. when theygo
public or when there is a leveraged buyout, their behavior would therefore be forecasted
to change. As a result, this theory may explain why profits of firms that are bought out
tend to rise and why profits of firms that go public tend to stagnate.
If publicly owned firms pursue different objectives than do privately owned firms, what
implications does this have for public policy? The model in section 1 does not necessarily
imply that publicly owned firms behave more efficiently. They may, for example, cooperate
with other firms in the industry to charge a price above marginal cost. In theory, taxes or
regulations could be used to encourage whatever ownership structure leads to the greatest
public benefits. If these effects are important, then any analysis of policies, e.g. the
corporate income tax, that may affect a firm's choice of organizational form needs to assess
whether or not publicly traded corporations behave more efficiently than other firms.
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